In this paper we present a partial equilibrium model of tax evasion in which evasion is modeled as a discrete variable, i.e. whether to join the underground economy or noto Several equilibrium concepts are used to analyze the game of the government against a single taxpayer.
Introduction
The problem of tax evasion arises in an economy in which every taxpayer regards the output of the public sector as independent of her actions and the taxpayer can be audited by the public authority and fined, if found guilty.
Earlier contributions to the study of tax evasion in a game-theoretical framework include , Wilde (1985, 1986) , , Greenberg (1985) , , , , , , and . Each of these papers focuses on the problem from a different angle, and obtains sorne conclusions on the welfare effects of tax evasion [a review of this literature can be found in and ]. In all these papers, evasion is modeled as a continuous variable, i.e. the range of evasion goes from zero to the value of due taxes. A prominent example of this kind of situation is income tax evasion.
No matter how important these situations are, there are examples in which it is more natural to model evasion as a discrete choice model, reflecting an
No matter how important these situations are, there are examples in which it is more natural to model evasion as a discrete choice model, reflecting an indivisibility in the choice of the potential tax-payers [see Cowell (1985, p. 174 footnote)]. Thus, for a given activity, the choice is either to be on the legal side, or to become a member of the underground economy. Examples of latter inelude barter transactions, black markets, illegal gambling and prostitution, secret workshops (shoes, garments, leather, furniture), street vendors, 'gypsy' cabs, rental of spare rooms, secret accounts in foreign countries, elandestine building, etc. In all these situations the parties concerned have no incentive to provide information (this lack of incentive is particularly acute if the workers involved are receiving unemployment benefits). Moreover, even in the income tax case, if someone decides to fill in a tax form underestimating his income, additional information is also transmitted: profession, address, etc. In sorne cases these signals may be so elear that it would be preferable not to fill this form in at all. This situation is particularly relevant in countries in which the fight against tax evasion is new and the public sector is relatively unorganized. For instance during the period [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] two million new taxpayers were discovered in Spain.
This paper presents a static par ti al equilibrium model of tax evasion in which there are two pure strategies for each player: for the taxpayer to evade or to pay due taxes (i.e. to be inside or outside the black economy) and for the government to monitor or not to monitor. 1 Thus our model -which is akin to those of externality causing behavior [see Becker (1968) and or Inspector vs. Evader games [see Rapoport (1966) ] -differs from previous work in the dichotomous choice of taxpayers and in that strategies for the government are interpreted as monitoring rather than auditing.
The rest of the paper goes as follows. In section 2 we analyze the game of the government against a single taxpayer, assuming that the government attempts to maximize net revenue [this assumption is also made by and ]. It is shown that: a. There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, but there is in mixed ones. This implies that the existing uncertainty is endogenous, caused by the randomized choices of the players. b. In expected terms the taxpayer pays the entire tax. c. An increase in the penalty for evasion increases the government's payoff but lea ves untouched the taxpayer's expected utility. d. The government cannot expect any gain by announcing (and being committed to) its true policy (i.e. being a Stackelberg leader). e. If the taxpayer were assumed to be a leader and the government a follower, the payoffs for the latter would be larger than in a Nash 1Also players are considered to be risk-neutral. However it can be shown that most of our conclusions do not depend on this. See indivisibility in the choice of the potential tax-payers [see Cowell (1985, p. 174 footnote)]. Thus, for a given activity, the choice is either to be on the legal side, or to become a member of the underground economy. Examples of latter inelude barter transactions, black markets, illegal gambling and prostitution, secret workshops (shoes, garments, leather, furniture), street vendors, 'gypsy' cabs, rental of spare rooms, secret accounts in foreign countries, elandestine building, etc. In all these situations the parties concerned have no incentive to provide information (this lack of incentive is particularly acute if the workers involved are receiving unemployment benefits). Moreover, even in the income tax case, if someone decides to fill in a tax form underestimating his income, additional information is also transmitted: profession, address, etc. In sorne cases these signals may be so elear that it would be preferable not to fill this form in at all. This situation is particularly relevant in countries in which the fight against tax evasion is new and the public sector is relatively unorganized. For instance during the period [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] two million new taxpayers were discovered in Spain.
The rest of the paper goes as follows. In section 2 we analyze the game of the government against a single taxpayer, assuming that the government attempts to maximize net revenue [this assumption is also made by and ]. It is shown that: a. There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, but there is in mixed ones. This implies that the existing uncertainty is endogenous, caused by the randomized choices of the players. b. In expected terms the taxpayer pays the entire tax. c. An increase in the penalty for evasion increases the government's payoff but lea ves untouched the taxpayer's expected utility. d. The government cannot expect any gain by announcing (and being committed to) its true policy (i.e. being a Stackelberg leader). e. If the taxpayer were assumed to be a leader and the government a follower, the payoffs for the latter would be larger than in a Nash 1Also players are considered to be risk-neutral. However it can be shown that most of our conclusions do not depend on this. See .
equilibrium and, given result (b) aboye, than in a Stackelberg equilibrium with the government as a leader. f. Maximin strategies call for honest behavior on the taxpayers' part and the same probability of monitoring as in a Nash equilibrium. g. If the penalty for evasion is sufficientIy high, the Nash equilibrium is arbitrarily elose to the core of the game. h. Bayesian equilibrium yields identical qualitative conelusions to those of Nash equilibrium.
Needless to say, aH these conelusions must be tested in more general models befo re any definite conelusion is drawn. In any case, our approach underlines the importance of mixed strategies. They are a natural device in our framework, since the elassical argument in favor of them, namely that they defend players against the opponent's exploitation of the knowledge of her actions, seems perfectIy applicable in our case. Moreover a mixed strategy equilibrium can be seen as the limit of Bayesian equilibria ].
FinaHy, section 3 gathers together our main conelusions.
The model and the main results
Consider a game with two players (2/', the taxpayer, and ~, the government), and two strategies for each of them (Al' A 2 and B l , B 2 respectively). We identify Al with evasion (A 2 no evasion) and Bl with monitoring (B 2 no monitoring). We assume that utility is money, i.e. both players are riskneutral. Let Y be the income of 2/'. The value of the tax due will be denoted by T. The fine will be proportional to the evaded tax. So if 2/' cheats and is caught she gets a fine of dT. We will take d and T as exogenously given. Let c be the cost of monitoring and conviction. We assume that c<dT (this may be interpreted as saying that the penalty for evasion ineludes the cost of monitoring). In order to make the problem interesting we will as sume that T> c (i.e. the tax due is greater than the cost of monitoring) and y> T. Table  1 summarizes our information about the game.
It follows from our assumptions that
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The model and the main results
Hence no dominant strategy exists.
Nash equilibrium
We first as sume that both players have to move simultaneously and that information is complete. Both assumptions will be relaxed later on. Let us first look for a Nash equilibrium. It is easy to check that there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Therefore we introduce mixed strategies. Let p be the probability of f!J> taking Al (i.e. she evades), and q the probability of f § taking Bl (i.e. monitoring). Then payoffs for f!J> and f § (denoted by Mp and Mg respectively) are
Mg=q(p(T -e+dT) +(1-p)(T -e)) +(1-q)(1-p)T, Mp=p(T-qT(1 +d))+ Y -T, Mg=q(pT(1 +d)-e)+(1-p)T.
Then, the probabilities associated with a Nash equilibrium are
The strategic aspects of the game are present in the values of p* and q*. For instance the probability of evading depends directly on e (the more costly it is to monitor, the more likely the evasion) and inversely on the penalty d. AIso, the probability of monitoring depends inversely on the penalty, since a high penalty will discourage evasion, making monitoring useless [see for similar conclusions]. Equilibrium payoffs are
Notice that:
Nash equilibrium
Mg=q(p(T -e+dT) +(1-p)(T -e)) +(1-q)(1-p)T, Mp=p(T-qT(1 +d))+ Y -T, Mg=q(pT(1 +d)-e)+(1-p)T.
The strategic aspects of the game are present in the values of p* and q*. For instance the probability of evading depends directly on e (the more costly it is to monitor, the more likely the evasion) and inversely on the penalty d. AIso, the probability of monitoring depends inversely on the penalty, since a high penalty will discourage evasion, making monitoring useless [see 
The Stacke/berg so/ution
Sorne times it is argued that 'the government, via its agent the tax authority, acts as a 'leader', and that taxpayers act as recalcitrant followers' [Cowell (1990, p. 123) ]. This corresponds to a situation in which ' § moves first announcing (and being committed to) sorne strategy, and f!IJ reacts in a rational way. This equilibrium is called a 'perfect Nash equilibrium' in modern jargon. Here we will show that the Nash equilibrium considered in the previous paragraph is also a Stackelberg equilibrium with ' § as leader and f!IJ as a follower.
For the time being assume that no mixed strategy is possible. Hence ' § will maximize over the reaction function of f!IJ. A quick inspection of table 1 shows that (B¡, Al) and (B l , Al) are the possible outcomes. Hence ' § will select Bl and the associated payoffs will be (Y -T, T -c). Notice that the equilibrium payoff of ' § is in this case T -c < Nash payoff. Now, let us introduce mixed strategies.
by identical reasoning to before, the optimal reply of f!IJ is p = 1. Then, Mg=q(T-c+Td)<T-c/(1+d)=Nash payoff, so q=1/(1+d) is the optimal choice.
Easy calculations show that in this case M g = T -c/( 1 + d), i.e. it do es not pay for ' § to be a Stackelberg leader. This is pretty surprising at first glance, since it implies that there is no incentive for ' § to commit himself. However a little reflexion on the structure of the game will convince the reader that this ís indeed the case. If for instance ' § announces B l , f!IJ will pay T. However ' § can expect this to happen if an adequate randomized (and hence cheaper) monitoring is made. If ' § announces B l , f!IJ will not pay anything. If ' § announces a randomized strategy which is not a Nash equilibrium for him, eqs. (1) and (2) show that f!IJ will evade or will pay completely. The first case is certainly not intended by ' §, and the latter can be achieved with a lower q, and hence with a lower expected cost. In other words, given the discontinuity 
For the time being assume that no mixed strategy is possible. Hence ' § will maximize over the reaction function of f!IJ. A quick inspection of table 1 shows that (B¡, Al) and (B l , Al) are the possible outcomes. Hence ' § will select Bl and the associated payoffs will be (Y -T, T -c). Notice that the equilibrium payoff of ' § is in this case T -c < Nash payoff. Now, let us introduce mixed strategies. If ' § sets q> 1/(1 + d) from (1) it follows that
Easy calculations show that in this case M g = T -c/( 1 + d), i.e. it do es not pay for ' § to be a Stackelberg leader. This is pretty surprising at first glance, since it implies that there is no incentive for ' § to commit himself. However a little reflexion on the structure of the game will convince the reader that this ís indeed the case. If for instance ' § announces B l , f!IJ will pay T. However ' § can expect this to happen if an adequate randomized (and hence cheaper) monitoring is made. If ' § announces B l , f!IJ will not pay anything. If ' § announces a randomized strategy which is not a Nash equilibrium for him, eqs. (1) and (2) show that f!IJ will evade or will pay completely. The first case is certainly not intended by ' §, and the latter can be achieved with a lower q, and hence with a lower expected cost. In other words, given the discontinuity in pjJ's behavior, the expected return of tax evasion should be zero, just like in the Nash equilibrium. This contrasts with where ~'s lack of commitment causes a loss in revenue. This contrast is explained by the fact that it is essential for their model that a fraction of taxpayers are 'pathologically honest' [see Mookherjee (1989, p. 22) ].
Finally, let us assume that pjJ is a leader and ~ is a follower. This corresponds to a situation in which pjJ has to send her report befo re ~ can take any action. Since T( 1 + d) > c the taxpayer will pay his entire taxes.
Thus, equilibrium gives more utility to ~ than any other non cooperative solution. This is due to the fact that under complete information ~ can catch any evader with probability one, i.e. if information is also perfect the opportunities for tax evasion vanish. Notice that in this case mixed strategies do not make any sense.
Maximin behavior
In our case, Nash equilibrium can be objected to on grounds of being unprofitable [see ], Le. Nash equilibrium payoffs are equal to maximin payoffs but Nash strategies are different from maximin strategies. In this case, it can be argued that maximin behavior is more plausible [see Holler (1990, p. 322 (2) it follows that maximin strategies are p + = ° and q + = 1/( 1 + d), i.e., pjJ is honest and ~ monitors with the same probability as in a Nash equilibrium.
The cooperative approach
In our framework, it is easy to see that any non-cooperative equilibrium yields inefficient outcomes. We now consider cooperative solution concepts and relate the outcomes obtained by cooperation with those obtained under no cooperation.
Let us take the core as the solution concept. a. The Nash equilibrium tends to the core; hence a high penalty will implement a core outcome through a Nash equilibrium, approximately, and in pjJ's behavior, the expected return of tax evasion should be zero, just like in the Nash equilibrium. This contrasts with where ~'s lack of commitment causes a loss in revenue. This contrast is explained by the fact that it is essential for their model that a fraction of taxpayers are 'pathologically honest' [see Mookherjee (1989, p. 22) ]. Finally, let us assume that pjJ is a leader and ~ is a follower. This corresponds to a situation in which pjJ has to send her report befo re ~ can take any action. Since T( 1 + d) > c the taxpayer will pay his entire taxes.
Maximin behavior
The cooperative approach
Let us take the core as the solution concept. a. The Nash equilibrium tends to the core; hence a high penalty will implement a core outcome through a Nash equilibrium, approximately, and 
Bayesian equilibrium
The previous analysis can be criticized since under complete information it is not at all clear which kind of tax evasion is captured by the model. There are two possible answers to this question. On the one hand, mixed strategies can be understood as the limit of Bayesian equilibrium, when uncertainty over types becomes negligible [see ]. On the other hand, under simultaneous moves, those taxpayers who evade can get away with it in absence of monitoring. The same happens if ' § moves tirst. So in these models tax evasion arises from wrong monitoring and not from incomplete information. This is also seen by noting that evasion is impossible if f!jJ plays tirst. Here we will consider explicitIy a game with incomplete information in order to see what difference it makes. It will be shown that conclusions 
The previous analysis can be criticized since under complete information it is not at all clear which kind of tax evasion is captured by the model. There are two possible answers to this question. On the one hand, mixed strategies can be understood as the limit of Bayesian equilibrium, when uncertainty over types becomes negligible [see ]. On the other hand, under simultaneous moves, those taxpayers who evade can get away with it in absence of monitoring. The same happens if ' § moves tirst. So in these models tax evasion arises from wrong monitoring and not from incomplete information. This is also seen by noting that evasion is impossible if f!jJ plays tirst. Here we will consider explicitIy a game with incomplete information in order to see what difference it makes. It will be shown that conclusions obtained under complete information are carried out with straightforward modifications. This reinforces our idea that tax evasion is due to imperfect, rather than, incomplete information.
For the sake of simplicity suppose that ' § is uncertain about the true value of the tax due, but f!J' is not, i.e. we assume one-sided uncertainty. This can be formalized by saying that f!J' can be of types 1, ... , n with taxes due t¡, ... , t n and that f!J' knows her true type but ' § does not. Let us assume that the probability of f!J' being of type i = 1, ... ,n -denoted by 1t¡ -is common knowledge. Let t = Il= 1 1t¡t¡ be the expected value of taxes due.
We first notice that the optimal strategy set by f!J' is independent of her type and identical to the Nash equilibrium case. This follows from the fact that fines are proportional to taxes due and therefore the utility function of f!J' if she where of type i is t¡p( 1-q( 1 + d)) + Yi -t¡ where Yi is her income.
Thus if 1 > (resp. <)q(l+d) the optimal p is 1 (resp. O). If l=q(l+d) any p maximizes the aboye expression. Since the optimal probability is independent of the type, we will denote it by p as before.
When playing against type i ' § can expect a payofT of q(pt¡ ( Then it is easy to show that all the conclusions obtained in sections 2.1-2.4 carry on under incomplete information. However -in contrast to aH our previous results -the extension to non-risk-neutral agents is not straightforward. See and for additional results with risk-neutral taxpayers. FinaHy if t(l + d) < e, i.e. if expected profit from a monitoring is negative, equilibrium entails p = 1 and q = O.
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered a simple model of strategic interaction obtained under complete information are carried out with straightforward modifications. This reinforces our idea that tax evasion is due to imperfect, rather than, incomplete information.
In this paper we have considered a simple model of strategic interaction between taxpayers and the government focusing our attention on the case in which taxpayers' decision is dichotomous (to be inside or outside the black economy) in a static framework. Moreover, we did not study how taxes are set, i.e. in terminology of Cowell (1990, p. 131) we focus on pure enforcement. However sorne conclusions appear to be robust enough to be worth mentioning.
First, the probability of monitoring is the same in Nash, Stackelberg (with ~ as a leader), maximin and Bayesian equilibria.
Second, the probability of evading is the same (and positive) in Nash, Stackelberg (with ~ as a leader), and Bayesian equilibria. However in both maximin and Stackelberg (with f!jJ as a leader) the taxpayer is honest. This probability can be interpreted under sorne circumstances as the equilibrium relative size of the underground economy.
Third, the payoff of f!jJ in every non-cooperative equilibrium is the same as if she where honest.
Fourth, a high penalty for evaders is (as in many models of tax evasion) socially desirable. Of course introducing a probability of error in convictions [see ] may yield an appropriate upper bound to penalties [see Nalebuff and Scharfstein (1987) for cases in which this is not the case and an infinite penalty is socially desirable].
Fifth, tax evasion is due to imperfect, rather than incomplete, information. Sixth, revenues from taxes are maximized when ~ is a follower and f!jJ is a Stackelberg leader.
How should the last result be interpreted? Since present-day governments can scarcely be considered as maximizing agents, the emphasis must be on the normative side. In this sen se, our analysis recommends ~ to behave as a follower (it must be remarked that there is nothing surprising in the fact that payoffs for the government are higher for a follower than for a leader: The same happens in models of price-making firms in the literature on industrial organization). However, this kind of solution makes sense if the decision of being a member of the black economy is taken before ~ takes any action. This implies a delay which may be unacceptable beca use of legal constraints or because of high interest andjor inflation rates. Notice that an important consequence of all this is that when modeling tax evasion 'a la principalagent' (in which ~ acts as a leader) we are not exploring the best alternative from ~'s point of view. In other words, in general models we may regard evasion as arising from both incomplete and imperfect information. If ~ acts as a follower, the opportunities for evasion arising from the latter disappear.
Finally we mention two possible extensions of our work: First, to model explicitly the interests of monitors [see Laffont and Tirole (1988) ], and second to consider evasion and consumption in a unified framework (see ; and ].
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